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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we analyze the effect of the introduction of IFRS standards on the performance of IPOs, and more 
precisely on the short and long term. Findings clearly indicate reduced level of underpricing in the IFRS 
standards era and marginally better adjusted long-term underperformance. Measuring these returns in calendar 
time, we find statistical significance with several of the benchmarks employed. Using buy and hold abnormal 
returns, we confirm the low underpricing level of Dutch IPOs. Cross-sectional regressions of short- and long-
run performance disclose several significant factors. An underwriter’s reputation and market (hot) condition 
prove to be significant in both short- and long-term cases. In contrast to many studies, we attribute long-run 
underperformance to IPOs listed during cold market periods. Results associated with pricing during the “hot 
IPO period” indicate better long-term (3-year) performance. 
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1. Introduction 
The global application of IFRS
23
 and its consequences on firms‘ financial reporting has provoked a 
highly active debate among researchers. Empirical evidence has largely focused on measurements of 
accounting quality subsequent the application of IFRS and its economic consequences. However, these 
studies failed to examine the role of IFRS in the performance of IPOs.  
  It has been since 2005 that all EU-listed firms are required to prepare their consolidated 
accounts under IFRS. In this way, the European Union attempted to improve financial reporting quality 
and increase comparability of financial statements in Europe. With the mandatory introduction of IFRS 
the achieved quality of accounts challenged researchers to explore how accounting and finance 
phenomena have been affected. In this paper, we examine empirically to what extent IFRS 
implementation contributes in the flattering of underpricing phenomenon and whether IPOs after 
adopting IFRS do perform better in the long term by presenting lower level of the existing reported 
severe underperformance. 
There is an endless number of theories trying to explain the level of underpricing—the 
phenomenon of a large positive gain to a new issue (relative to its offering price) immediately after 
listing—that has been reported in many markets. Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), who spoke about the hot 
issue markets, were the first. Baron (1982) assumes in his principal agent model that investment banks 
act as agents of the issuers, which could build a moral hazard situation. Ritter (1984) defines ex ante 
uncertainty theory while Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that the amount of ex ante uncertainty about 
                                               
2
 In June 2002, the European Union (EU) Council of Ministers approved a regulation requiring EU-listed companies to 
prepare consolidated financial statements in accordance with IFRS for years beginning on or after January 1, 2005. The Act 
was approved by the European Parliament and enacted into law on September 11, 2002, as Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 19, 2002, on the Application of International Accounting Standards 
(IAS). 
3 IFRS are the accounting principles prepared and published and written by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB). These accounting principles have the explicit objective of creating a single set of accounting principles that are 
intended to result in the improved comparability of financial statements by reducing differences among countries' 
accounting practices (i.e., Financial Accounting Standards Board (1996)). In many cases the implementation of IFRS results 
in a smaller set of choices within generally accepted accounting practices and thus can be viewed as increasing overall 
disclosure by firms. The reduction of choices within generally accepted accounting practices generates higher quality public 
information for firms implementing IFRS. 
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true firm value is the main determinant of the level of underpricing in IPOs. The latter researchers build 
on Rock (1986), who interprets underpricing as a premium for uninformed investors for the winner's 
curse problem they face vis-à-vis informed investors. This is from where the best-known underpricing 
explanation, asymmetric information, comes, with Booth and Smith (1986), Carter and Manaster 
(1990), and Michaely and Shaw (1994) pointing out that the specific way to reduce information 
asymmetry is to hire prestigious underwriters. Further, Booth and Smith (1986), Chemmanur and 
Fulgheri (1994), Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004),
4
 Derrien (2005), Edelen and Kadlec (2005), 
and Kutsuna et al. (2009) focus on how offer prices relate to long-run or intrinsic value.  
There is extensive evidence of short-term underpricing as well as convincing international 
evidence of long-term underperformance. This is where the long-run return of the new public company 
has a lower performance than the benchmark. Studies in numerous countries have confirmed 
underperformance after one (Aggarwal and Rivoli, (1990); Lee et al. (1996); Chan et al., (2004),
5
 three 
(Ritter (1991); Lee et al., (1996); Chan et al., (2004)), and five years (Loughran and Ritter, (1995)). 
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990);  attribute underperformance to a temporary overvaluation of the IPO firm 
at the offering date, the so-called fads theory. After a while, the over-optimism disappears, and the 
value of the new share will be downwardly adjusted. Ritter (1991) has further advanced the fads theory 
and showed that IPO firms with a high-risk profile (i.e., younger, smaller, and active in certain sectors) 
are subject to shareholder sentiment sooner, the so-called fads of the stock market. 
Based on those theories, we will make an effort to address a number of questions associated 
with the introduction of IFRS standards. We start with the main one: Does the introduction of IFRS 
results in reduction of the level of underpricing in the Netherlands? Do Dutch IPOs present lower 
underperformance over the long term after the adoption of IFRS? How do various benchmarks affect 
long-term performance in the Netherlands? What are the determinants that affect short- and long-term 
                                               
4 Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) on the relation between underpricing and overpricing on the aftermarket indicate a 
fair pricing at IPO and overpricing after that. 
5 Surprisingly, Katsuna et al. (2009) report 1-year holding-period returns in excess of 200%. 
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performance? Has the use of IFRS improved the reliability of pubic offering procedure? How did 
Dutch IPOs react during the Internet bubble at the end of the ‘90s? 
A part of the period we cover is characterized by the formation of the Internet bubble that 
induced a large number of growth (new economy) firms to go public, resulting in a hot issue market 
from 1997 to 2000.
6
 The IPO literature focuses on the phenomenon of ―hot issue markets,‖ i.e., periods 
that are characterized by a large number of offerings and a high average underpricing (Ritter, 1984; 
Derrien (2005); Ljungqvist et al. (2006); Derrien and Kecskes, (2007). Big differences in IPO 
underpricing occur during the hot/cold periods, depending on the time period a firm selects to go 
public. 
During the study period covered, many changes happened in the international arena that 
affected the Dutch market and the flow of IPOs as well. Most important is the central theme of our 
study, the mandatory adoption of IFRS by listed and firms aiming to list in Euronext Amsterdam. 
Further, but not of minor importance there were two big crises in recent times: the 2000 Internet bubble 
crisis that affected the stock market and the number of listings and the 2008 global housing bubble that 
raised questions regarding bank solvency and damaged investor confidence, creating an impact on 
global stock markets, which suffered large losses during late 2008 and early 2009.  
Our motivation relies on discovering the Dutch market reaction on IFRS accounting practice 
and the returns to shareholders under various benchmarks. On this issue, Dimson and Marsh (1986) and 
Fama and French (1996b) provide considerable evidence that benchmark selection can have an 
important impact on the scale of abnormal returns. We compare abnormal returns under a number of 
alternative benchmarks and compute abnormal returns up to three years after the offering. Our study 
employs the basic capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the Fama and French (1996) three factors 
model, and the Carhart (1997) FF3F-type model extended for the momentum.      
                                               
6 Gajeski and Gresse (2006) report that, for some countries (France, Belgium, Sweden, Poland), the hot period started in 
1997. There have been four countries that do not match the general pattern. For the Polish, Turkish, and, to a lesser extent, 
the Greek markets, 1995 and 1996 were also active periods. 
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We employ a sample of 141 Dutch IPOs listed over the period 1990-2011. The findings indicate 
that Dutch IPOs‘ returns in the short term are among the lowest in the world. IFRS adoption further 
assists on reducing the level of underpricing and contributes in markets disclosure transparency.  In the 
long term, IPOs in the Netherlands underperform and provide negative returns to their investors. The 
study provide evidence that underperformance is marginally lower following the introduction of IFRS. 
On the determinants side, we find, according to our predictions, a positive and significant relationship 
between the size of the firm and returns to the investors in the three-year long-term period. This 
suggests that large firms perform better and can be a safer investment in the long term. We also find a 
positive relationship between market condition (hot/cold) and returns in the long aftermarket. This 
relationship holds strong irrespective of the period (one, two, or three years) of study. Finally, in 
contrast to expectations, non-reputable underwriters are associated with better returns in the very long 
term (up to 36 months).  
Our study makes several contributions to the IPO literature. Initially, this is the first study in 
international level to explore the IPOs short and long term returns using two balanced samples, before 
and after the introduction of IFRS. Second, this is the first Dutch study that explores long-term returns 
through Fama and French‘s (1996) (extended) value weighted three factors model. Third, it examines 
the determinants that affect the underpricing and long-term performance in Euronext Amsterdam. 
Fourth, this study provides additional evidence on the performance in the long term of Dutch IPOs in 
‗hot‘ market periods. Fifth, we make an effort to position the Dutch results among the other developed 
global markets.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the international 
literature and discusses the application of IFRS in the Dutch market. Section 3 formulates the 
hypothesis while section 4 presents the data and analyses the methodology. Section 5 shows the results 
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for the long-term performance of IPOs and section 6 presents the regression results. Finally, Section 7 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Empirical studies on initial performance of initial public offerings 
 
2.1. Long and short-term evidence of IPO performance in international developed markets 
 
In this subsection, studies on major international markets are reviewed. We emphasize 
providing evidence from the dominant markets on each continent, except Europe, where we had the 
opportunity to review the neighbors of the Netherlands, the developed markets of France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom (UK). Further, we explore all previous studies conducted on Dutch IPOs.    
Loughran et al. (1995) provide a very good summary of the average initial returns of 1,103 
IPOs in Australia covering a period of thirty years (between 1977 and 2007). The evidence, which was 
built on many studies, indicates initial underpricing of 19.8%.
7
 The result is consistent with the view 
that unique institutional characteristics may have overwhelmed previous tests of equilibrium models of 
IPO underpricing. The results by Lee et al. (1996) reveal that Australian IPOs significantly 
underperform market movements as the IPOs provide negative returns of -18.76%, -35.60%, and -
51.58%, one, two, and three years subsequent to listing, respectively. The main explanatory variables 
for the one year market adjusted returns as Dimovski and Brooks (2004) report are excess return, 
market sentiment and limited liability
8
.  Across the Pacific Ocean, Chi et al. (2010) on a fifteen years 
(1991-2005) for New Zealand indicate mean raw initial return of 6.67%.  
Tian and Megginson (2007) report that the Chinese stock market has grown very rapidly, but is 
often distorted by government regulation, and this is especially true for the initial public offering 
market. The average underpricing of Chinese IPOs is 247%, the highest of any major world market. 
The sample covers 1,397 IPOs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges between 1991 and 
                                               
7 Lee et al. (1996a), on a sample of 266 Australian IPOs, present underpricing of 16.41%. 
8 The positive coefficient on the excess return (Month) variable supports indicate that any overoptimism and price support at 
the time of the float, subsides from the first month. One more finding by Dimovski and Brooks (2004) suggest that Limited 
Liability IPOs exhibit a superior one year return performance to no liability IPOs. 
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2004.
9
 Chen et al. (2000)
10
, Chan et al. (2004)
11
 and Cai et al.(2008) examine the long-term 
performance. Cai et al.(2008) in the most recent evidence find poor long-run performance of Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs). Initial overoptimism and the size of the offer are important explanatory factors 
for this underperformance. Additional variables include the earnings per share prior to listing, the 
decision to switch investment banks at the time of issue and whether the firm issues shares that can be 
purchased by foreign investors. These factors suggest that firms in China are able to manipulate the 
issue process. 
Jenkinson et al. (2005) document that, for a sample of 740 European IPOs, European 
underpricing is, on average, 22.3% (15.2% for 174 French IPOs, 47.5% for 224 German IPOs, 4.8% for 
51 Italian IPOs, 9.0% for 124 UK IPOs, and 14.3% for 50 Dutch IPOs). If Germany is excluded from 
the European sample, the average underpricing relative to the initial price range falls to 15.1%. 
Jenkinson et al. report that the infrequency in Europe of revisions to initial price ranges, and the 
clustering of offer prices at the top of the initial ranges, appears inefficient. Gajewski and Gresse (2006) 
confirm the medium European underpricing level and report average initial returns of 22.06% for 2,104 
IPOs from 15 countries (5.36% for 363 French IPOs, 38.93% for 415 German IPOs, 10.26% for 135 
Italian IPOs, 21.27% for 454 UK IPOs, and 22.92% for 47 Dutch IPOs). The authors take a step 
forward and provide evidence on the long-term performance of European IPOs.
12
 Evidence of 
                                               
9 The pricing of IPO shares in China is subject to a cap set by the government, and the supply of IPO shares allowed in the 
market is also set by the government through the Chinese quota system. The government regulator even controls the timing 
of floating of shares onto the stock exchange (after the initial public offering is executed), and there is usually a long time 
lag between the IPO and the actual listing of shares for trading. 
10 Chen et al. (2000) find that B-share IPOs underperform A-share IPOs (and the market) during the post-issue periods for 
up to three years. The results of multivariate regression analyses strongly suggest that economic factors determining the 
post-issue performance of IPOs differ across the A-share and B-share samples. 
11 Chan et al. (2004) based on a one- to three-year period report that Chinese A-share IPOs slightly underperform their non-
IPO benchmarks with the wealth relatives. In contrast to the result for A shares, B-share IPOs outperform the market as the 
wealth relatives are always greater than 1.00 during these 36 months after listing. The buy-and-hold returns for Chinese 
IPOs indicate average percentage returns during the six months and one, two, and three years of 5.74%, 11.55%, 30.66%, 
and 75.07%. 
12 Gajewski and Gresse (2006) split their sample based on market segments, period of listing, and floatation mechanism. 
The 821 IPOs listed in traditional markets present first-day initial returns of 11.58% while the 947 listed in the new markets 
have initial returns of 28.46%. IPOs listed during the ‗hot‘ period of 1998-2000 have initial returns of 27.18% while the 
returns are much lower at 15.86% and 12.195 for those listed during the 1995-1997 and 2001-2004 periods, respectively.     
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underperformance at the one-year term is unclear (the average first-year CAR equals -21.59%, but the 
average first-year buy-and-hold abnormal return [BHAR] is only -1.52%), while they find a significant 
three-year underperformance of -32.61% for the BHAR benchmark, and -87.19% for CAR. Individual 
countries‘ BHAR one- and three-year returns are 11.44% and -36.33% for France, -19.57% and -
53.69% for Germany, -7.01% and -30.47% for Italy, and, finally, for the UK, -10.96% and -27.74%. 
Ritter (2009) in a sample of 12,022 US IPOs (issued between 1960 and 2008) and gross 
proceeds of $650 billion reports that initial public offerings are significantly underpriced by 16.9%. 
The level of underpricing was extremely high during the Internet bubble period of 1999-2000, 64.1%, 
and significantly lowers since after, 11.5%. Valero et al. (2009) on foreign issuers of U.S. IPOs report 
they are prominent firms in their home countries, they are larger and of better quality than domestic 
issuers, their U.S. IPOs are underwritten by prestigious underwriters, and they enjoy greater analysts' 
coverage. Cai et al. (2010) examine the underpricing of U.S. firms that went public globally (global 
IPOs) and report mean first-day returns for 797 IPOs of 46.20%.
13
 The increased underpricing of 
globally listed US IPOs was motivated by expanding investor demand under favorable overseas market 
conditions and increasing visibility through global placement. In an earlier study, Jenkinson et al. 
(2005) point out differences in regulations and practice between the U.S. and Europe. Consistent with 
partial adjustment to positive news from investors (Benveniste and Wilhelm, (1990); Hanley, (1993); 
Sherman and Titman (2002), Chan et al (2007)
14
 ), U.S. IPOs are commonly priced above the upper 
bound of the indicative price range and still exhibit large first-day returns. Ritter (1991) has been the 
first researcher to provide evidence on the long-term performance of IPOs. Using various robustness 
benchmarks, he reports average three-year holding period returns of 34.47%. Ritter (2009), in an 
                                               
13 Cai et al. (2010) report pre-bubble (1986-1997) underpricing of 11.97%, Internet bubble (1998-2000) first-day returns of 
81.85%, and post-bubble initial returns of 14.21%.     
14 Chan et al (2007) find that the offer price valuation efficiency for global IPOs exceeds that of IPOs with purely domestic 
offers by 3.1%. In particular, the global offering approach is most appropriate to those IPO firms, which offer larger 
proportion of new shares to international investors, underwritten by less prestigious investment banks and with larger firm-
specific return variance. Their findings are consistent with the demand inelasticity, certification effect and investor 
recognition arguments that account for the benefits of global offering. 
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update of the initial sample and in 7071 IPOs, reports an average BHAR of 21.8%. Once the returns are 
adjusted for the market, the returns turn negative at -20.3%.  
Champers and Dimsons (2009) provide the longest period study in the field of IPOs for the 
United Kingdom as these authors cover 4,540 firms listed from 1917 to 2007. The overall proceeds UK 
IPOs managed to explore was £131 billion while the mean initial return was 14.57%. There has been an 
increasing trend in the initial returns over the decades that peak over the 2000-2007 period at 19.86%.
15
 
This mainly reflects the growth of London‘s alternative investment market, which facilitated numerous 
IPOs by very small companies; there were even higher average levels of underpricing. The overall 
post-WWII rise in underpricing cannot be attributed to changes in firm composition, and occurred in 
spite of improvements in regulation, disclosure, and the prestige of IPO underwriters. Coakley et al. 
(2009) for a sample of 591 IPOs report a high combination between venture capitalists and prestigious 
underwriters and report that the 1998-2000 bubble years featured significant increases in underpricing, 
money left on the table, and a decline in operating quality. Levis (1993),
16
 Espenlaub et al. (2000), and 
Goergen et al. (2007) examine the long-term performance of IPOs listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. Levis (1993), for his sample during 1980-88, shows that initial public offerings in the UK 
underperformed a number of relevant benchmarks in the 36 full months of public listing following the 
firms‘ first day of trading. The magnitude of underperformance is more pronounced when account is 
taken of the superior performance of smaller companies. Espenlaub et al. (2000), in a sample of 588 
IPOs, find substantial negative abnormal returns to an IPO after the first three years while, over the five 
years after an IPO, abnormal returns exhibit less dramatic underperformance.
17
  
                                               
15 Champers and Dimson (2009) report it can be seen that from 8.96% (1917-1929) and 5.43% (in the 1930s) in the interwar 
decades, the equally weighted mean level of underpricing subsequently rose to 11.86% (in the 1950s) and then 14.01%  (in 
the 1960s). After a narrowing to 8.65% in the 1970s, the equally weighted mean level of underpricing averaged 15.80% in 
the  1980s. 
16 Using a sample of 712 IPOs listed on the London Stock Exchange in 1980 to 1988, this study documents an average first-
day return of 14.3%. 
17 Levis (1993) reports CAARs of -11% for the zero-one FTA benchmark. By contrast in Espenlaub et al. (2000) CAAR 
over 36 months ranges from -15.9% for the CAPM to -28.155 for the FF model.   
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Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) provide evidence for 470 German IPOs coming to the market 
from 1990 to 2000. The level of underpricing is high at 40.2% for such a mature market. Loughran et 
al. (1995), on evidence that mainly comes in a collection of studies, report initial returns for 700 
German IPOs listed during 1978-2008 of 25.3%. Underpricing in Germany is significantly related to 
the stock market, macroeconomic conditions, insider retention rates, and the inverse of real gross 
proceeds. Ljungqvist (1997), Stehle et al. (2000), Gajewski and Gresse (2006), and Bessler and Thies 
(2007) examine the long-term performance of IPOs listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Evidence 
indicates a three-year mean abnormal performance using BHAR of -12.11% (Ljungqvist, (1997), -6% 
(Stehle et al., (2000), and -31.6% (Gajewski and Gresse, (2006). Once the benchmark changes to CAR, 
the one- and three-year returns are -31.06 and -171.13. Long-term performance indications confirm 
Ljungqvist‘s observation that one-year after-market returns simply follow market movements and the 
conclusion that ―investors can benefit considerably by purchasing shares offered through IPOs.‖ This 
trading strategy, however, becomes unprofitable if shares are held for more than a year: after three 
years. To conclude, in the longer term, German IPOs do share the U.S. experience of 
underperformance, while this experience has a more severe impact on the financial health of German 
new listed firms‘ investors. 
Van Frederikslust and Van der Geest (2001), Roosenboom and Van der Goot (2005), and 
Doeswijk et al. (2006) provide evidence on the short-term performance of Netherland IPOs up to 2001 
(Panel C, Table 1).
18
 Van Frederikslust and Van der Geest (2001) report an average level of 
underpricing of 13% for 38 private equity-backed Dutch IPOs and 17% for 68 non-private equity-
backed IPOs. Roosenboom and Van der Goot (2005) and Doeswijk et al. (2006) find an average initial 
underpricing level of 11.03% and 17.6%, respectively. Doeswijk et al. (2006) report that, during the 
                                               
18 Van Frederikslust and Van der Geest (2001) use a sample of 106 IPOs covering the period 1985-1998, Doeswijk et 
al.(2006) employs 183 IPOs listed in Amsterdam Stock Exchange between 1977 and 2001, Van der Goot (2003) examines a 
sample of 92 IPOs listed between 1983 and 1997, and Roosenboom and Van der Goot (2005) use  a sample of 118 IPOs 
during the period 1984-2001.  
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first three years of listing, Dutch IPOs on average underperformed their benchmark by a cumulative 
10.0%. When calendar-time is employed, the returns for the calculation of their IPO sample, long-term 
performance after one, two, and three years of long-term relative performance, are 6.8%, 6.0%, and 
12.9%, respectively. They suggest that investors should always subscribe to an IPO and there is no 
urgency to sell immediately after listing.  
 
2.2 Application of IFRS in the Dutch Market  
 
     As in the majority of developed markets the annual reports of companies listed on Euronext 
Amsterdam after 2005 are IFRS based. Prior, the annual reports of the Dutch listed companies were 
following Dutch GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles). Capstaff et al. (1996) provides a 
comparative analysis of earnings forecasts in Europe using fourteen countries (including the 
Netherlands). They compare accounting and the capital market environment under four headings - 
earnings behaviour, frequency timeliness and quality of accounting disclosure, influence of taxation, 
and securities markets.  
According to their analysis, earnings in the Netherlands have relatively low volatility and show 
small positive changes. Regarding frequency, timeliness and quality of accounting disclosure, the 
Netherlands are ranked as second best (after the UK) with respect to the quality of accounting 
disclosure. On taxation, the Netherlands had an accounting system like Denmark, Ireland and the UK 
that was relatively free from the influence of taxation. Therefore, Dutch management had no incentive 
for tax reasons, to depress reported earnings - unlike the systems in Germany and France. Turning to 
the effects of securities markets, Capstaff et al. (1997) suggested that if value was a function of 
earnings, the frequency and resources devoted to forecasting and to improving the accuracy of forecasts 
is likely to be significant.  
 12 
In the Netherlands, there seemed to be a high degree of association between earnings and share 
prices
19
. According to the classification of Nobes and Parker (2000, p. 59) the Netherlands had an 
accounting system which is based in business economics (sample room for current cost and market 
value applications) and is extreme judgmental. In other words, before 2005 the Dutch accounting 
system was of a high level and comparable with the system used in the UK. The largest advantage of 
introducing IFRS was from a Dutch perspective that the Dutch annual reports became more comparable 
with the reports of many other European countries. Also for foreign investor on the Dutch markets 
made the same IFRS-based annual reports easier to interpret. A higher degree of comparability means a 
lower risk for the potential investor. 
Non-listed companies may use Dutch GAAP or IFRS. Deviation from IFRS means an 
additional risk (and therefore that company should pay a higher bank interest rate). This is a strong 
reason why large non-listed Dutch companies use IFRS. Non-listed companies that are preparing 
themselves for an IPO also use IFRS in the pre-IFRS period. In the case of an IPO the IFRS means that 
the potential investors are in a better position to valuate the new-listed company. They can compare it 
with (foreign) companies working in the same industry. Our hypothesis is that the introduction of the 
IFRS in 2005 reduces the risk of (potential) investors. Therefore we expect that the underpricing on the 
day of the IPO will be less after the introduction of the IFRS in 2005 than before. 
 
    2.3 The recent global economic crisis in the Netherlands 
 
During the observed period, the financial sector in the Netherlands was a relatively important one. The 
financial crisis in 2008 hit this sector very strongly. Most of the activities of Fortis, which had together 
with the Royal Bank of Scotland and Santander just taken over ABN Amro, were sold to the Dutch and 
                                               
19 Generally, the accounting and capital market environment in the Netherlands were reasonably comparable to the UK 
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Belgian governments, and ING has had to accept the financial help of the Dutch government. The price 
of the interventions by the governments is that the European Union demands that these banks have to 
sell the main part of their activities. The international networks of the Dutch banks will be substantially 
reduced, and these banks will become only local players. These developments will influence the IPO 
market and the place of the stock market Euronext Amsterdam as well. Foreign banks will become 
more important for IPOs of international companies on the Dutch Stock Exchange. These foreign banks 
know the Dutch market less well than the locals, which can make the underpricing of an IPO larger. 
 
3. Formulation of hypotheses-determinants of the long-run IPO performance in the Netherlands  
We hypothesize that long-run Dutch IPO performance is a combination of the managerial 
decisions and quality of firms and markets when firms decide to go public. Few prior academic studies 
have documented the relationship between the long-run performance and the strategic decision made 
by a firm before its listing. Characteristics such as listing board classification, age of the firm by the 
time it goes public, size, underwriters‘ reputations, hot IPO period, given ownership, time lag between 
the IPO announcement and the first day of trading, and industry classification among others could have 
an effect on the long-run performance.  
 
In the subsequent paragraphs, we will provide details about the eight variables of our 
multivariate regression model.  
LBC: LBC is expected to proxy for higher IPOs reputation for those firms that can achieve listing on 
the main market. Consistent with Ljungqvist et al. (2003) and Thomadakis et al. (2011), who reported 
that IPOs traded in the primary market yield higher returns in the long run, we expect this to exert a 
positive influence on returns. 
 
 14 
H1: IPOs listed in the main market are expected to have better returns (less underperformed) over the 
long term.  
 
Age: Ritter (1991) documented a more pronounced long-run under-performance for younger IPOs and 
interpreted this evidence as being consistent with the over-optimism explanation. We anticipate the 
coefficient on age (AGE) to be positive for the long-run return analysis. 
 
H2: The older the firm, the better the long-run performance after the IPO.  
 
SIZE: IPO size (SIZE) is measured by the logarithm of capital raised by the offering. In previous 
studies, Keloharju (1993) and Goergen et al. (2007) have shown better long-term performance for large 
IPOs while Lee et al. (1996) revealed positive returns for small firms in a one-year period. Overall, we 
expect that size will be associated with better long-term performance.  
 
H3: The larger the firm, the better the long-term performance after the IPO. 
 
Underwriter reputation: Carter and Manaster (1990), Spiess and Pettway (1997), Carter et al. (1998), 
Kim and Ritter (1999) and Dimovski (2010)
20
 specify that prestigious underwriters are associated with 
lower risk offerings and lower initial returns expected from IPOs, which are underwritten by reputable 
banks. Valero et al. (2009) on foreign issuers of U.S. IPOs report they are of better quality than 
domestic issuers and are underwritten by prestigious underwriters. In the long-term field, Ljungqvist 
and Wilhelm (2002), Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), Johnson and Westberg (2009), and Thomadakis 
et al. (2011) hypothesize that underwriters‘ reputation will positively affect long-run returns.  
                                               
20 Dimovski et al (2010) examines 380 Australian Industrial IPOs and report underpricing. 29.6%. 
 15 
 
H4: The better the underwriter‘s reputation, the most promising the long-run performance after the 
IPO.  
 
Market Conditions (Hot/Cold): Ritter (1984) suggests that some companies prefer to issue IPOs in 
‗hot‘ markets when the general level of the stock market is increasing, while other companies select 
‗cold‘ market periods when the general stock market level is stable or declining. Boehme and Colak 
(2008) report that, relative to cold-market IPOs, on average, hot-market IPOs face higher liquidity 
frictions, higher information constraints, and higher idiosyncratic risk. Thomadakis et al. (2011) show 
that IPOs listed during the cold period experience better returns over the long term.  
 
H5: IPOs listed during the cold period are expected to have better long-term performance after the IPO. 
 
Sold Ownership: It measures the percentage of equity issued at the time of the offering. Lee et al. 
(1996) report an increasingly positive association between levels of initial sold ownership and post 
listing returns. Similar, Mikkelson et al. (1997) used the proportion of secondary shares sold in the IPO 
and found it to be positively related to the post-IPO performance. This result contradicted evidence 
provided by Jain and Kini (1994) and Goergen et al. (2007), who found a significant positive relation 
between post-IPO operating performance and equity retention by the original shareholders.  
 
H6: The higher the percentage of equity sold, the worse the long-run performance.    
 
Time Lag: The period between the official date of the prospectus announcement (or offer price date) 
and the listing date of an IPO in developed countries is assumed to be short; however, in less developed 
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countries, it is expected to be longer. This variable has been well researched by literature related to the 
short-term performance of IPOs, but there is a gap in studies covering the long term. We believe that a 
short period between the offer price day and the first day of trading will positively affect the long-term 
performance.  
 
H7: The shorter the time to listing period, the better the long-run performance.    
 
Industry classification: IPOs are classified in groups based on their sector. Sectors like construction, 
technology firms, and textiles are found to have beta higher than 1, while housing, commercial and 
travel firms have beta lower than 1. Industries, which have a factor beta greater than 1, were more 
risky; therefore, we expect lower returns in the long term.  
 
H8: Non-industrial IPOs are expected to have better long-term performance.
21
 
 
4. Data and methodology 
 
4.1 Data  
We collected data on the IPOs date, offering price, the first day closing price and general index 
historical prices direct from Euronext Amsterdam. Independent variables information was extracted 
from Thomson Financial Datastream (TFD) and Bloomberg. Overall the study covers 141 new listed 
companies in NYSE-Euronext Stock Exchange over the 1990 to 2011 period (94 using Dutch GAAP 
and 47 employing IFRS). To construct the benchmarks, we collected returns for all traded stocks 
during the observed period. 
                                               
21 Industrial are classified those firms that belong in the Chemicals, Industrial (pure), Manufacturing, Metals, Minerals, and Shipyards 
sub-sectors. No industrial are mainly Conglomerate, Finance, Real Estate/Property, Transportation, Tourism/Hotels, etc.  
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Table 1, Panel A, clearly shows two peaks during the sample period. The first and major IPO 
peak occurred during the Dutch GAAP era between 1997 to mid-2000 and is characterized by the large 
number of IPOs of growth stocks. This period was hot for the entire world as we had the boom of 
Internet IPOs. The second peak occurred when IFRS was on practice from the beginning of 2006 until 
the end of 2007. This period is characterized by a second, less intense large number of IPOs going 
public. A common feature of those two periods is that at the end there was a stock market crash. 
Especially at the end of the second period, the entire global financial system experienced the second 
largest crisis after the Great Depression of 1929.  
Panels B-C of Table 1 presents summary statistics for 141 Dutch IPOs (94 listed during GAAP 
and 47 using IFRS). The Dutch firms have average capital raised of €544 million during Dutch GAAP 
era and 2.97 billion during IFRS period and an average age of 21.87 years during Dutch GAAP era and 
34.05 years during IFRS period, indicating that IFRS stricter regulations attracted more firms with long 
operating history and rejected considerable new firms which did not satisfy the new criteria. It is 
noteworthy that there has been a firm with a history of 202 years before going public. Time lag, the 
period between the last date of the public offering and the first day of the stocks‘ listing average is as 
low as 4.09 days during GAAP and 1.85 days during IFRS periods respectively) while the average 
market adjusted initial returns is 16.35% during the GAAP era and only 4.43% during the IFRS period 
providing a first signal that underpricing is getting reduced after the use of new standards.  
Panel C reveal an initial indication of higher underpricing (18.47%) during Dutch GAAP 
period. Dutch market presents phenomenal low underpricing during IFRS period. (It seems to me that 
this result is very attractive.  Fourthly, during the period 1995-2004 we collected 85 IPOs, while 
Gajewski and Gresse (2006) have only 47 IPOs in their dataset. It seems that the dataset of Gajewski 
and Gresse is incomplete. An explanation can be that Gajewski and Gresse only look at IPOs with a 
constraint, for example minimum amount of capital raised.  I think we have to discuss the results we 
found comparing the results of the other studies, presented in panel C of table 1. 
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Table 2 describes various features of the IPOs sample across different periods in the aftermarket 
(one and three years) using both accounting standards. The selected IPOs characteristics are market 
classification, firm's age at the time of issuance, listing price (issue‘s offer price) decided between the 
issuers and underwriters, the reputation effect of the last ones in the long-term returns, and market heat 
divided into hot and cold periods (each quarter in the periods between 1990-2004 and 2005-2011 are 
classified as hot or cold based on the general index returns and the number of listed IPOs). 
There is evidence that IPOs listed in the secondary market are more likely to be short-sale 
constrained (SSC) than the ones listed in the main market for Years 2 and 3. Findings reveal that SSCF 
Percentage for the firms in the "High" underwriters‘ reputation sample have significant negative six-
month returns when the firms are compared with IPOs listed in the "Low" underwriters‘ reputation 
sample. This effect is more pronounced during earlier months. Results presented in Table 2 (Market 
Heat Panel) indicate that hot IPOs provide higher negative results to the IPOs‘ loyal investors in 
periods between six months and two years of listing. Everything appears to change in the three-year 
period after firms go public as IPOs listed during cold periods offer higher losses.  
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics of the Dutch IPO Sample 
The table presents details of the Dutch IPOs and control samples. Panel A provides the number of listed IPOs in every calendar year this 
study covers. This panel contains further details on the total annual capital raised by IPOs. Panel B presents statistics of Dutch IPOs 
specific characteristics.  The covered IPO characteristics are the IPO's market classification, age at the time of issuance, the IPO firm's 
size measure by market capitalization (Market value is computed as the number of listed shares times the offer price), underwriters 
reputation based on their prestige in the market, proportion of given ownership by pre-IPO shareholders, time lag between the last date of 
public offering period and first day of stocks‘ listing (days). Panel C reviews underpricing level from previous studies in the Netherlands 
Panel A: Number of observations in The Netherlands based on market listing  
Event Year IPO firms full 
sample 
 Event Year IPO firms full 
sample 
 
1990 4                 2001 1  
1991 2  2002 0  
1992 2  2003 1  
1993 1  2004 2  
1994 5  2005 5  
1995 6  2006 15  
1996 7  2007 15  
1997 15  2008 5  
1998 22  2009 4  
1999 17  2010 1  
2000 9  2011 2  
   Total 141  
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Dutch IPO during GAAP era – 94 IPOs 
 Mean Median Maximum 
Market Adjusted Initial Return 16.35 9.50 113.27 
Listing Board Classification 0.53 - - 
The age of the issuing firm (years) 21.87 12.73 114 
Capital Raised (€ million)  544m 93.91m 6.04b 
Underwriters reputation (dummy) 0.562 - - 
Market Heat 0.656 - - 
Proportion of given ownership by the initial shareholders (%) 23.14 - 50 
Time lag between the last date of public offering period and first 
day of stocks‘ listing (days)  
4.09 2.0 15 
IPOs belonging in the industrial sector (dummy) 0.312 - - 
Offer Price 22.78 15.90 90.76 
Panel C: Summary Statistics of Dutch IPO listed after introduction of IFRS – 47 IPOs 
 Mean Median Maximum 
Market Adjusted Initial Return 4.43 0.61 65.14 
Listing Board Classification 0.59 - - 
The age of the issuing firm (years) 34.05 14 208 
Capital Raised (€ million) 2.97 b 466m 29.8b 
Underwriters reputation (dummy) 0.431 - - 
Market Heat 0.777 - - 
Proportion of given ownership by the initial shareholders (%) 31.55 21.10 90 
Time lag (days)  1.85 1.0 14 
IPOs belonging in the industrial sector (dummy) 0.159 - - 
Offer Price 15.39 10.63 99.75 
Panel D: Empirical studies on Dutch IPO Performance  
Authors Period Data Set Mean Underpricing 
Doeswijk et. al. (2006) 1977 - 2001 154 14.9% 
Van Frederikslust and Van der Geest (2001) 1985 - 1998 106 16% 
Gajewski and Gresse(2006) 1995 - 2004 47 22.92% 
Van der Goot (2003) 1983 – 1997 92 15.23% 
Roosenboom and  Van der Goot (2005) 1984 – 2001 118 11.03% 
Roosenboom et al. (2003) 1984 – 1994 64 3.82% 
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Table 2 
Short Sale Constraint in IPO Stocks 
The IPOs are grouped into sub-samples that are short sale constrained according to 1) listing board classification (if IPO is 
listed in the main or secondary market of NYSE-Euronext), 2) age of the firm 3) offer price 4) underwriter reputation, 5) 
market heat. The results for Dutch GAAP and International FRS, 1-year and 3-years after the IPO date are presented. The 
rows ‗Prob‘ presents the probabilities that the test statistics of the nonparametric Wilcoxon two-sample test (equality of the 
percentages across the groups) are greater than their corresponding critical values (Prob of Z > jZaj). The column named 
"Num." under each post-IPO period shows the number of IPOs in each group.  
Sorting 
Variable 
 Year 1 
AGAAP 
Year 3 
AGAAP 
Year 1 
IFRS 
Year 3 
IFRS 
  Perc Num Perc Num Perc Num Perc Num 
Listing Board Main -15.50% 49 -26.54% 49 2.73% 26 -4.11% 25 
Classification Second -19.78% 45 -37.00% 45 -0.66% 21 -27.01% 19 
 Prob 0.432  0.329  0.371  0.212  
 
.         
Age Old -2.47 56 -13.42% 55 10.45% 28 18.48% 26 
 Young -28.24 38 -52.97% 38 -3.83% 19 -35.69% 18 
 Prob 0.228  0.091  0.178  0.078  
          
Offer Low -22.1% 41 -17.4% 41 -11.8% 27 -31.87% 26 
Price High -14.1% 53 -44.2% 51 18.4% 20 25.9% 19 
 Prob 0.364  0.341  0.070  0.000  
          
Underwriter Low  -15.22% 41 5.29% 41 10.49 26 -1.86% 24 
Prestige High -19.26% 53 -65.28% 53 -11.50 21 -20.89% 20 
 Prob 0.725  0.071  0.067  0.083  
          
Market Cold.  -10.34% 32 9.91% 32 -34.08% 11 -11.32% 11 
Heat Hot -21.35% 62 -1.24% 62 -32.59% 38 -11.75% 36 
 Prob 0.500  0.185  0.464  0.285  
          
 
4.2 Methodology 
     The adjusted return for issue i is defined as the raw return less the corresponding market return for 
the same time period used for raw return calculation: 
 
                     ARit  =  (Rit) –  (Rmt)                          
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where Rit is the IPO return i at time t and Rmt is the market portfolio return at time t. 
     The average adjusted return on a portfolio of n stocks for event month t is the equally weighted 
arithmetic average of the adjusted returns. 
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The abnormal IPO return for a certain period is defined as the cumulative abnormal return over a time 
period from the offer date, i.e., 
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To calculate the abnormal return ai,t the first benchmark we use is the standard Capital Asset 
Pricing Model. The second is the Fama and French (1993) three factors model which  The third 
benchmark is another multi-index model where the factors are those specified by Carhart (1997), who 
extends the Fama and French model for momentum phenomena. 
 
Model 1: CAPM   
 
itftmtiitftit eRRaRR  )(                                                  (3) 
where Rit is the monthly return for each security, Rmt is the return on the Dutch market in event month t 
as measured by the return on the NYSE-Euronext Stock Exchange General Index (NYEGI), Rft is the 
treasury bill (T-bill) return in event month t, and i is the CAPM beta of company i.  
Fama and French (1993) show that when the standard three-factor model (without the 
momentum factor in Eq. (5)) is estimated in randomly chosen sample firms with small size and low 
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book-to-market ratio, the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance is overrejected. In Section 2, 
we show that the majority of our sample consists of small and growth firms, thus this potential problem 
can be particularly severe. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) also raise the possibility that the intercept 
under the null hypothesis may be biased under the standard calendar-time approach. 
 
Model 2: Fama and French (1996) three Factors model (FF3F) 
 
pttptpftmtppftpt eHMLSMBRRaRR   )()(                                
(4) 
 
The portfolio excess returns are regressed onto the four factors as introduced by Carhart (1997). 
 
Model 3: Carhart four factors model (1997) extension of the Fama-French model, containing an 
additional momentum factor (FF4F) 
 
pttptptpftmtppftpt eUMDHMLSMBRRaRR   )()(               (5) 
where Rpt is the calendar-time portfolio return, Rft (risk-free return rate) is the return of 1-month 
Treasury Bill, (Rmt-Rft) is the return on the value-weighted portfolio, SMBt stands for "small (market 
capitalization) minus big"during month t, HMLt is the return differential of "high (book-to-price ratio) 
minus low"value-weighted portfolios firms in a month, and UMDt is the difference between returns of 
portfolios of high-and-low momentum stocks.  
We estimate a series of multiple-regression models, using buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) 
as dependent variables for a period up to three years after going public. The regression model is as 
follows: 
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(BHAR) = a + β1 (MAR) + β2(AGE) + β3Log(SIZE) + β4 (UND) +β5 (H/V) + β6 (GO)+ β7 (TLAG) + 
β8 (IND)  + εi   (6) 
 
 
5. Descriptive statistics 
 
In Table 3, we show the average BHARs of IPOs undertaken during the period 1990-2011. Panels A 
and B present the unadjusted returns as those were calculated from the offer price day and the end of 
the first day of trading. Panel C shows the adjusted returns,
22
 which are calculated based on the listing 
price of new issues and the closing price of the NYSE-Euronext General Index (NYEGI) on the last 
day of the public offering period. Panels D and E report the BHARs that are calculated, based on 
closing price at the end of the first day (month) of trading and the closing price of NYEGI on the same 
date.  
The initial excess return received by investors was low at 12.65%, indicating that Dutch stock 
market is mature and everyone involved in the IPO procedure is delivering a very good outcome. As 
already mentioned the application of new standards manages to reduce underpricing which has always 
been the desire of issuers and underwriters as it drops from 16.35% to 4.43%. This result indicates that 
IFRS offers a solution to the underpricing phenomenon and loyal implementation of IAS by potential 
listing companies can alleviate the problem and reduce the amount of money left on the table. 
Moreover, the one-year mean-adjusted return calculated based on the listing price, the first-day 
closing price, and the sixth-month closing price reached -2.72%, -13.10%, and 37.15%, respectively. 
The two-year returns were -12.52%, -23.54%, and 1.45%. Finally, the corresponding three-year returns 
were -21.13%, -29.53%, and -22.82%. These results reveal that new issues in the Netherlands stock 
market offer investors negative long-run adjusted returns even before the completion of one year after 
listing. The situation is different when our calculations start from the sixth month of trading as the 
                                               
22 The adjusted returns have been calculated as the raw returns minus returns of the General Index of the A.S.E. for the same time period 
used for raw returns calculation. 
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returns remain positive for the following two years (until 30 months after going public) and then turn 
severely negative. 
Concentration on GAAP and IFRS samples indicate that underperformance remains after the 
alteration of the standards but with less intense mode as -17.43%, -31.20% and -33.22% returns one-, 
two- and three years after listing (counting from the end of first day of trading) with Dutch GAAP 
standards is reduced into -2.37%, -15.17% and -19.75% once IFRS came on board. Investors which 
decide to place their money six months after going public continuously enjoy positive returns in the 
future in the IFRS period.  
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Table 3  
Buy-And-Hold Adjusted Returns23 for IPOs from the Euronext Amsterdam Time Period 1990-2011 
Buy-And-Hold Adjusted Returns are defined as the unadjusted returns less the corresponding market returns: returns of the General Index 
of the NYSE-Euronext (value-weighted index) for the same time period used for unadjusted returns calculation. IPO-adjusted returns 
taken in a three-year period (from beginning of first day of trading until 36 months after going public) are based on IPO prices of offer 
price period and end of first trading day. The differences in the number of firms in each panel are due to not having the data for the period 
of analysis to estimate three- and five-year returns. Total returns include both capital gains and dividends.   
Panel A: Unadjusted Buy-And-Hold Returns based on the listing price  
 Total Sample Before IFRS After IFRS 
Return of Mean Return  
(%) 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Return  
(%) 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Return  
(%) 
Number of 
observations 
1st day 12.72 141 18.47 94 3.15 47 
6 months 4.73 141 5.97 94 1.74 47 
12 months -1.33 135 -5.71 94 2.22 41 
24 months -19.53 131 -8.40 94 -35.41 37 
36 months -20.30 129 -17.34 94 -27.41 35 
Panel B: Unadjusted Buy and Hold Returns based on the first day closing price 
Return of Mean Return  
(%) 
Number of 
observations  
Mean Return  
(%) 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Return  
(%) 
Number of 
observations 
6 months -0.54 141 -4.64 94 2.13 47 
12 months -5.68 135 -8.94 94 -4.97 41 
24 months -13.38 131 -12.59 94 -16.38 37 
36 months -22.04 129 -21.83 94 -24.16 35 
Panel C: Excess or Adjusted Buy and Hold Returns based on the listing price 
Return of Mean Return  
(%) 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Return  
(%) 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Return  
(%) 
Number of 
observations 
1st day 12.65 141 16.35 94 4.43 47 
6 months 2.12 141 4.39 94 -2.23 47 
12 months -2.72 135 -2.23 94 -4.02 41 
24 months -12.54 131 -12.78 94 -12.20 37 
36 months -21.13 129 -22.16 94 -17.35 35 
Panel D: Excess or Adjusted Buy and Hold Returns based on the first day closing price 
Return of Mean Return  
(%) 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Return  
(%) 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Return  
(%) 
Number of 
observations 
6 months -5.42 141 -9.18 94 1.34 47 
12 months -13.10 135 -17.43 94 -2.37 41 
24 months -23.54 131 -31.20 94 -15.17 37 
36 months -29.53 129 -33.22 94 -19.75 35 
Panel E: Excess or Adjusted Buy and Hold Returns based on the six month closing price  
Return of Mean Return  
(%) 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Return  
(%) 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Return  
(%) 
Number of 
observations 
12 months 37.15 135 36.26 94 40.12 41 
24 months 1.45 131 0.43 94 3.42 37 
36 months -22.82 129 -23.51 94 19.31 35 
                                               
23 The IPO price changes that give the adjusted returns include dividends and repurchases on their (**ambiguous) final formation 
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Table 4 
Abnormal returns for initial Public Offerings in 1990-2011 
Post-listing average-adjusted returns (ARt) with associated t statistics and cumulative average returns (CARt) for the 36 
months (where month one represents the market index-adjusted return from the last sale price on the day of listing to the end 
of that calendar month) after going public, excluding the initial return. Our final sample constitutes 141 Dutch initial public 
offers of ordinary equity made between January 1990 and June 2011, calculated on the basis of an equal euro investment in 
each issue. 
Month  No of firms trading ARt (%) t-stat CARt  (%) 
1 141 0.672 0.631 0.672 
2 141 0.414 0.382 1.083 
3 141 0.093 0.080 1.174 
4 141 -0.092 -0.083 0.254 
5 138 -1.247 -1.172 -0.997 
6 135 -1.063 -0.982 -2.272 
7 135 -0.933 -0.872 -2.992 
8 134 -1.437 -1.363 -4.429 
9 134 0.174 0.140 -4.255 
10 133 -0.579 -0.496 -4.834 
11 132 -0.215 -0.175 -5.048 
12 132 0.129 0.096 -4.491 
13 132 -1.094 -0.967 -6.009 
14 131 -1.292 -1.142 -7.301 
15 131 -1.844 1.702* -9.145 
16 131 -1.682 -1.592 -10.825 
17 130 -2.172 -1.931* -12.997 
18 129 -1.245 -1.129 -14.242 
19 129 -1.743 -1.639* -15.982 
20 129 -1.165 -1.048 -17.147 
21 128 -1.821 -1.716* -18.968 
22 128 -0.521 -0.470 -19.446 
23 127 -1.668 -1.572 -21.115 
24 127 -1.994 -1.862* -23.109 
25 127 -2.162 -2.031** -25.271 
26 127 -1.603 -1.495 -26.874 
27 127 -0.978 -0.903 -27.852 
28 126 -0.231 -0.173 -28.082 
29 125 0.674 -0.616 -27.408 
30 125 1.131 1.054 -26.277 
31 124 0.081 0.072 -26.193 
32 121 -0.198 -0.145 -27.392 
33 121 -1.057 -0.981 -27.442 
34 121 -0.413 -0.364 -27.028 
35 121 -0.815 -0.770 -27.843 
36 121 -1.051 -0.972 -28.937 
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Table 5  
Calendar-time regression for alternative benchmark models 
Time-series models are the Capital Asset Pricing Model, Fama and French 3 Factors Model, and the Carhart (1997) extension of Fama 
and French (1993) model. Figures in brackets are the t statistics. The regressions in each case are estimated using monthly observations, 
with the dependent variable being either the return on a 12-, 24-, and the 36-month portfolio of IPOs minus the risk-free rate and the 
independent variables being the benchmark factors. Alpha is the intercept term; Beta is the sensitivity of the excess returns on the 
company to the excess return in the market (NYEGI); Gamma is the sensitivity of the excess returns on the company to the ―small firms 
premium‖, which is taken as (Rsc-Rmt), and as SML for FF3F&FF4F; Delta is the sensitivity to the HML factor in the FF3F&FF4F 
models; and Epsilon is the sensitivity to the momentum factor in the FF4F model. In the case of the FF4F model, the dependent variable 
(Rpt-Rft) is the excess return on an equally weighted (τ=12, 24 or 36 months) portfolio of IPOs that were issued up to month t;  
Panel A: 12-month portfolio 
 CAPM FF3F FF4F 
Alpha  0.0008 0.0003 0.0008 
t-stat (0.141) (0.027) (0.161) 
Beta 0.261 0.274 0.239 
t-stat (2.110) (2.130)** (1.685)* 
Gamma  0.005 0.029 
T-stat  (0.034) (0.191) 
Delta  0.174 0.159 
t-stat  (1.261) (1.128)** 
Epsilon   -0.086 
t-stat   (-0.605)** 
Adj R
2 
0.068 0.098 0.103 
Panel B: 24-month portfolio  
 CAPM FF3F FF4F 
Alpha  -0.00743 -0.00637 -0.00603 
t-stat (-2.325) (-1.626) (-1.598) 
Beta 0.011 0.221 0.378 
t-stat (0.078) (1.420) (2.197)** 
Gamma  -0.409 -0.431 
T-stat  (-2.607)*** (-2.815)*** 
Delta  -0.111 0.215 
t-stat  (0.830) (1.523) 
Epsilon   0.309 
t-stat   (1.931)** 
Adj R
2 
0.032 0.096 0.210 
Panel C: 36-month portfolio  
 CAPM FF3F FF4F 
Alpha  -0.00422 -0.00275 -0.00273 
t-stat (-1.264) (-0.841) (-0.837) 
Beta 0.051 0.005 -0.010 
t-stat (0.793) (-0.023) (-0.046) 
Gamma  0.024 0.030 
T-stat  (0.113) (0.140) 
Delta  0.310 0.302 
t-stat  (1.595) (1.462) 
Epsilon   -0.031 
t-stat   (0.148) 
Adj R
2 
0.012 0.095 0.104 
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Table 4 gives the average monthly AR returns and CAR returns with the associated t-statistics 
for the 36 months after going public. The results show that the Dutch IPOs consistently under-
performed during the studied period. Both the AR and CAR show that the underperformance was much 
more severe in the second year after the IPO. All the returns are negative and suffer a continuous 
decline. A sharp fall starts after the 14th month and continues until the end of study‘s 26th month. At 
the end of the 36th month, the cumulative adjusted monthly returns stood at 28.93%. 
      Table 5 reports the times series estimates of the Fama-French three factor model in equation (4), 
the restricted version of the model (corresponding to the CAPM), and the extended version of Carhart 
(1997) including the momentum in equation (5). The results are quite revealing, as they show 
significant differences among periods and among benchmarks.  
As in the event-time regressions, the FF4F benchmark produces marginally statistically 
significant underperformance, but the negative excess returns are now also insignificant for the CAPM 
and the FF3F case. In all cases, the intercept term is negative, with abnormal returns for the 36-month 
portfolio of -0.42% per month under the CAPM, -0.27% per month for the FF3F, and -0.27% per 
month under the FF4F model. But in none of the cases is the underperformance statistically significant.  
It appears significant in the 24-month portfolio under the CAPM with abnormal returns of -
0.74%. Market effects are significant in FF3F and FF4F in the 12- and 24-month portfolios, and there is 
a tendency for the beta coefficient to drift downwards over time in each of the models. Size effect is 
also significant in the Fama and French four factors models. Finally, the momentum effect is 
significantly different from zero for the 12- and 24-month portfolios but not for the 36-month 
portfolios.  
 The implication of the results in Table 5 is that much of the underperformance in the long term 
occurs because a large proportion of the sample firms went public in periods (such as 1997-1999 and in 
2006-2007) that were subsequently associated with highly negative abnormal returns. Averaging the 
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event time returns across IPOs therefore creates high underperformance for the sample as a whole. 
However, according to Espenlaub et al. (2000), in the calendar-time approach, which involves equal 
weighting of the IPO returns in each monthly rolling portfolio, this underperformance is much less 
spectacular. 
 
 
6. Cross-sectional regression 
 
     In the estimation of the cross-sectional regression, we use BHARs, which are computed on closing 
prices after the first day of trading. In Table 6, regressions (1, 2) show the results on the short-term 
period using MAIR/IR as dependent variables and regressions (3, 6) show the long-term returns. 
Because the dependent variable on the BHAR long-term returns is skewed, the residuals are also highly 
non-normal; bootstrapped p-values are reported.
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The results show the listing board classification variable is statistically significant in the long run 
(six-month period) and confirms the positive returns taken for those IPOs listed in the main market of 
the stock exchange. The result is consistent with Ljungqvist et al. (2003) and Schlag and Wodrich 
(2004), who report that IPOs traded in the primary market yield significantly high returns in the long 
run, whereas those that are listed in the secondary market tend to underperform their market benchmarks 
by more negative results. 
The coefficient for AGEi is negative and statistically significant for MAIR, indicating that IPOs 
with a short operating history before going public are highly associated with short-term initial 
returns/underpricing. The result turns exactly the opposite in the long term, and consistent with Ritter 
                                               
24 Barber and Lyon (1997) document that positive skewness leads to negatively biased t-statistics. To conduct significance tests for initial 
returns, we apply the skewness-adjusted t-statistic. Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) argue that only the bootstrapped application of this 
skewness-adjusted test statistic yields well-specified test statistics. We follow their approach and report the adjusted t-statistics based on 
the distribution of bootstrapped resamples. The hypothesis is that the number of observed positive initial returns equals the number of 
negative returns. The bootstrapping procedure described by Noreen (1989) creates a coefficient vector under the null hypothesis of no 
relation by randomly reordering the 254 dependent variable observations and running an OLS regression. This is repeated many times, 
creating a distribution of least square coefficient vectors. The bootstrapped p-values are calculated by finding the location of the original 
coefficient vector in the ranked empirical distribution, variable by variable. The bootstrapped p-values that are reported are similar to the 
ordinary least squares values. 
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(1991), older IPOs experience better returns in a period up to six months after going public. 
Surprisingly, the evidence turns insignificant in longer periods.    
The firm size, a proxy for ex ante uncertainty, is measured by the capital raised during the offering. 
To be consistent with Miller (1977) prediction (i.e., a negative relationship between the long-run 
performance and uncertainty), regressions should yield positive coefficients for Log(Size) because the ex 
ante uncertainty is inversely related to a firm's size. Our findings using BHAR as a dependent variable in 
Table 6 reveal that small IPOs have significantly better long-term adjusted returns in the six-month 
period but large IPOs perform better up to three years. The last result aligns with previous studies 
(Keloharju (1993) and Goergen et al. (2007), which predict better long-term performance for large IPOs.  
The coefficient for underwriter reputation in the short term is positive, indicating that IPOs listed on 
the NYSE-Euronext Stock Exchange with a reputable underwriter will immediately reward their 
investors with positive returns. The results reveal exactly the opposite in the long term as there is a 
negative determinant in two regressions out of four (one and three years). The finding suggests the 
possibility that reputable underwriters foster high aftermarket prices in the short run (i.e., in the first 
month of trading), producing more pronounced subsequent negative returns.  
Further, a factor that proves to affect the newly listed firms‘ is hot/cold market conditions during the 
listing period. In the short term, we find a strong association between IPOs listed during the cold period 
and positive returns. In the long term, the findings show that ‗hot‘ IPOs have significantly better returns. 
A positive sign indicates that IPO issuers should be very careful with the timing of the listing, and they 
should decide to go public only when bullish periods are prevailing in the market. Our finding opposes 
Loughran and Ritter‘s (1995) results that firms going public during ‗hot markets‘ have more severe 
long-term underperformance than other firms.  
An interesting finding of this study relates to the time lag variable: contrary to the hypothesis, the 
short period between the IPO announcement and the first day of trading indicates a high level of 
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underpricing. In the long-term field, there is no significant evidence in the six-month and one-year 
periods. Everything seems to change in the two holding years where the high statistical significance 
indicates that a short period in waiting to go public is an indication for good long-term returns. Any 
delay in the start trading decision after the completion of the shares allocation may cause damage in the 
long-term performance of the IPO as this signals that management is not ready for this big step in the 
firm‘s history.   
 
Table 6 
Results of multivariate regression analysis of cross sectional variation in MAIR as dependent variable for 141 IPOs listed on 
NYSE-Euronext over the 1990-2011 period (end of 1st day of trading) 
MAIR is market adjusted initial returns MAIR=[(CP i,1-OPi,0)/Pi,0-(Mi,1-Mi,0/Mi,0)], ER1Y1D, Adjusted returns from first day price to first year 
after going public, ER2Y1D - Adjusted returns from first day price to two years after going public, ER3Y1D - Adjusted returns from first day 
price to three years after going public, MAR, Listing Board Classification which gets the value ‗1‘ if listed in ‗main market‘, ‗0‘ if listed in 
‗parallel market‘, Ln (1+AGE) the natural log of the total of one plus the age of the company in years on the listing date, Size – market 
capitalization, log of the total number of listed shares during the IPO multiplied by price per share, UR, Underwriters reputation which gets the 
value ‗0‘ for non reputable and ‗1‘ for reputable underwriters, H/C, IPO listed in Hot Periods ‗1‘ and IPOs listed during Cold periods gets ‗0‘, 
GO, proportion of given ownership during the going public process, TLAG, Time lag between the date of prospectus and first day of trading, 
IND, identify the sector of IPOs. Industrial are classified those firms which belong in Chemicals, Industrial (pure), Manufacturing, Metals, 
Minerals & Shipyards sub-sectors. No industrial are mainly Conglomerate, Finance, Real Estate/Property, Transportation, Tourism/Hotels etc *, 
**, *** indicate the level of significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
 
Specifications 
 
(1)  - MAIR 
 
(2) – IR 
 
(3) ER6M1D 
 
(4) ER1Y1D 
 
(5) ER2Y1D 
  
(6) ER3Y1D  
Constant (1.914) (1.690) (1.841) (-1.096) (-0.802) (-2.145) 
MAR -0.036 -0.045 0.329 0.011 -0.149 -0.132 
  (-0.220)  (-0.334)  (2.332)**  (0.009)  (-1.524)  (-1.295) 
AGE -0.342 -0.079 0.531 0.078 0.041 0.048 
 (-2.430)** (-0.679) (3.633)*** (0.675) (0.261) (0.273) 
SIZE -0.105 -0.194 -0.247 0.042 -0.044 0.193 
  (-0.996)  (-1.645)  (-1.918)**  (0.351)  (-0.261)  (1.691)* 
UND 0.361 -0.051 -0.037 -0.213 0.085 -0.312 
 (2.622)** (-0.390) (-0.252) (-1.791)* (-0.710) (-2.245)** 
H/C -0.287 0.019 -0.243 0.306 0.486 0.287 
  (-2.049)**  (0.087)  (-1.966)**  (2.236)**  (3.494)***  (2.128)** 
GO -0.066 0.033 -0.157 0.096 -0.014 -0.027 
 (-0.573) (0.202) (-1.572) (0.898) (-0.065) (-0.159) 
TLAG -0.276 -0.082 0.016 0.052 -0.171 -0.069 
  (-2.042)**  (-0.775)  (0.184)  (0.472)  (-1.676)*  (-0.599) 
IND -0.113 -0.197 -0.041 0.013 0.343 0.128 
 (-1.116) (-1.728) (-0.197) (0.009) (2.430)** (1.292) 
       
R2 Adjusted 0.194 0.161 0.313 0.103 0.254 0.179 
N 141 141 138 136 129 118 
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Table 7 
Results of multivariate regression analysis of cross sectional variation in MAIR as dependent variable for 94 IPOs listed 
during 1990-2004 period under GAAP and 47 IPOs listed during 2005-2011 period under IFRS in NYSE-Euronext.  
 
Specificatio
ns 
  
(1)-MAIR 
Dutch GAAP 
 
(2) ER1Y1D 
Dutch GAAP 
  
(3) ER2Y1D 
Dutch GAAP 
 
(4) ER3Y1D 
Dutch GAAP 
 
       (5)-MAIR  
      After IFRS 
 
(6) ER1Y1D 
After IFRS 
  
(7) ER2Y1D 
After IFRS  
Constant (0.730) (0.225) (0.0252) (0.593) (0.716) (0.189) (0.630) 
MAR -6.343 22.65 -53.13 9.75 -27.38** 55.93 35.55 
 (0.831)  (0.297) (0.257)  (0.881) (0.0238)  (0.259)  (0.336) 
AGE 0.204 1.55 -1.114* -0.871 -0.143 0.368 0.025 
 (0.638) (0.000) (0.0881) (0.328) (0.256) (0.168) (0.948) 
SIZE 4.536 0.836 -19.44** -6.017 1.214 -10.53 -6.48 
 (0.505)  (0.837) (0.0284)  (0.610) (0.591)  (0.158)  (0.352) 
UND 66.80*** 4.14 -75.26*** -120.67** -15.57* 18.46 22.23 
 (0.00271) (0.855) (0.00111) (0.027) (0.0553) (0.683) (0.449) 
H/C -80.14*** 14.69 -11.53 -5.66 -3.399 -70.68 17.61 
 (0.00616)  (0.504) (0.845)  (0.938) (0.841)  (0.225) (0.575)  
GO 0.0741 -0.475 0.746 1.26** -0.104 -0.125 -0.202 
 (0.790) (0.088) (0.104) (0.041) (0.519) (0.804) (0.621) 
TLAG -2.022 5.16 -8.074* -2.17 -6.924*** 6.60* 6.11*** 
 (0.395)  (0.019) (0.0819)  (0.718) (0.00469)  (0.095)  (0.003) 
IND -21.09 7.70 -16.93 5.11 33.49* 82.60** 59.46*** 
 (0.492) (0.709) (0.575) (0.902) (0.0828) (0.046) (0.004) 
        
R2 Adjusted 0.288 0.394 0.361 0.339 0.418 0.396 0.354 
N 94 94 94 94 47 47 47 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This study aims to examine the performance of IPOs in the Dutch stock market using 141 IPOs 
launched on the NYSE-Euronext Stock Exchange over the 1990-2011 period under two different 
regulatory regimes, the traditional Dutch GAAP and the improved financial reporting quality IFRS. It 
provides new evidence from a developed market on the extent in which IFRS implementation 
contributes in the flattering of underpricing phenomenon and investigates whether IPOs after adopting 
IFRS do perform better in the long term.  
We can summarize the results in five basic findings. First, there is strong evidence that switch 
to IFR standards helps on reducing the underpricing phenomenon and contributes on market efficiency. 
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Second, underperformance remains after the transformation of the standards but with less intense 
mode. This leaves a window for regulators to fight one of the most robust phenomena in the finance 
literature in order IPOs to gain the trust of long term oriented investors. Further, our third finding 
shows that Dutch IPOs underperform the market, as most international studies confirm in three-year 
long-term period. Fourth, IFRS proves to be a useful tool in the hands of underwriters and issuers as it 
reduces information asymmetry and facilitates accounts transparency.         
We have tested the stability of our results using alternative estimates of excess returns, 
alternative benchmark models (CAPM, Fama-French-Carhart models), and alternative constructions of 
time series (event-time versus calendar-time). Such extensive testing has not been performed before on 
Dutch data. We are satisfied that our results have passed the test of stability, and that our main findings 
do not depend on the alternative benchmarks and variable specifications.  
Cross-sectional analysis points up five factors that affect long-term performance. Listing of a 
firm with large raised capital is a signal for higher firm quality. Our measure of underwriter reputation 
indicates a negative influence on performance in one of our models. Although the result is sensitive to 
the benchmark model used, it casts doubt on the role of ―reputable underwriters‖ in the Netherlands as 
certifiers of firm quality. Further, crucial evidence, in our view, is the strong relationship between the 
extremely short waiting period in the pre-listing period and the associated low positive (underpricing) 
aftermarket returns to the investors.   
Individual results on Dutch GAAP sample indicate that IPOs with small raised capital, short 
operating history being advised by non-reputable underwriters are better for investment purposes. On 
the other hand IPOs listed following IFRS with the luxury of few additional days between the date of 
prospectus and first day of trading offer better returns. The explanation behind the last result is that 
IPOs need extra time to adopt precise IFR standards and finally set up the right issuing price.  
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Our fifth finding relates to pricing during the ―hot IPO period.‖ Since an unprecedented amount 
of capital was sought and raised by IPOs in the Netherlands during the ‗hot period,‘ it is seen that the 
features of these IPOs affected the results, as shown by our regressions. In our opinion, during hot 
periods, there are not only tendencies of short-term overpricing due to investor sentiment but also 
strong countering of the tendencies of underpricing due to strong issuer competition, as an ―IPO wave‖ 
developed.   
To understand the Dutch IPO market in depth and the influence of IFR standards, further study 
should be implemented on the relationship between initial pricing and allocation mechanisms. This will  
help us understand in depth some of the findings of this study and will mainly shed light on the low 
underpricing that appears at the end of the first trading day after the adoption of IAS. It is advisable for 
other developed and emerging markets to follow the Dutch experience with the small gap between the 
offering and the listing day, good investor protection mechanisms, companies‘ improved disclosure 
system, and overall enforced market efficiency. 
A question we had to address is why the Dutch case differs and provides such early negative 
long-term returns to its investors. One interpretation might be the lower information asymmetry 
compared with other cases, causing the market to be pragmatic about the initial public offerings. This 
fact contradicts Ritter‘s view (1991) that investors pay too much in the immediate aftermarket period 
for an IPO and then discover their ―mistake‖ in the following years. Another interpretation might be the 
ability of managers to judge the suitable timing for listing of their firms‘ stocks by observing the 
willingness of the market to pay too much for their stocks. The strong negative three-year returns for 
those IPOs listed in the hot market period support this argument. 
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APPENDIX A. Variables Definitions 
 
Variable Name  Variable Type of  Expected  
in Abbreviation Definition Measure Sign 
Panel A:  Measures of Abnormal Returns 
RIR Measures the returns at the end of the first day of trading. Continuous  
MAIR 
Returns to investors in the end of first day of trading adjusted with the returns of 
the market. Raw initial returns (RIR) are adjusted for market changes taking into 
account the NYSE-Euronext Stock Exchange General Index between the offer 
price closing date and the end of first day of trading. 
Continuous  
ER1Y1D, Adjusted returns from first day price to first year after going public Continuous  
ER2Y1D Adjusted returns from first day price to two years after going public Continuous  
ER3Y1D Adjusted returns from first day price to three years after going public Continuous  
Panel B:  Definition of Accounting Standards 
GAAP 
Dutch Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) refer to the standard 
framework of guidelines for financial accounting used in The Netherlands, 
generally known as accounting standards. GAAP includes the standards, 
conventions, and rules accountants follow in recording and summarizing, and in 
the preparation of financial statements. 
 
  
IFRS 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are principles-based 
standards, interpretations and the framework adopted by the International 
Accounting Standards Board. In order to be approved for use in The Netherlands, 
standards must be endorsed by the Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC), 
which is advised by a group of accounting experts known as the European 
Financial Reporting Advisory Group.  
  
Panel C: IPOs Characteristics 
MAR 
Dummy variable: 1 if an IPO is listed in Main Market and ‗0‘ if listed in Parallel 
or New Market. 
Discrete - 
AGE 
Age of the firm starting from the year of its establishment until the year it goes 
public. 
Continuous - 
UR Dummy variable: 1 for reputable underwriters, 0 otherwise Discrete + 
H/C IPO listed in Hot Periods ‗1‘ and IPOs listed during Cold periods gets ‗0‘ Discrete + 
TLAG 
Period between IPO announcement (the date of prospectus) and first day of 
trading. 
Continuous + 
SIZE 
Market capitalization measured by log of the total number of outstanding shares 
after the IPO multiplied by price per share. 
Continuous - 
IND 
Dummy variable: 1 for industrial classified companies, 0 otherwise. 
This research defined as ‗industrial‘ IPOs those firms which belong to Chemical, 
Industrial (pure), Manufacturing, Metals, Minerals & Shipyards sub-sectors and 
attached to them a value of one. Those not industrial are mainly Conglomerate, 
Real Estate/Property, Transportation, Tourism/Hotels etc and get the value of zero 
 
Discrete 
- 
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